The Aakhya Weekly #108 |QUAD: A Multiverse of Diplomacy
In Focus: Four to Tango- QUAD After the Tokyo Summit
by Swapneel Thakur
Source: Ministry of External Affairs- Flickr Account
As the foreign ministers of India, Japan, Australia, and the US concluded the recent Quad summit in Tokyo, consensus on the call for a free and open East and South China Seas and a stance against terrorism was prominently featured in many articles, highlighting the Quad as a key multilateral initiative in the Indo-Pacific region.
Indeed, what is envisioned to be the Asian NATO in the Indo-Pacific, Quad has been in focus for all four countries involved since its renewed thrust during the pandemic. As a strategic counter to aggressive Chinese influence and securing a liberal trading system, all members must rely on each other’s prowess to achieve its initial vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, amid these developments, it is undeniable that while India, Japan, Australia, and the US share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, they are not geographically close like other regional frameworks. This results in multiple foreign policy initiatives that may or may not align with all stakeholders' interests.
India: Balancing China and Maintaining Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy
For India, troubled by recent Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and in the WTO, the Quad is often seen as an independent alternative that may provide leverage in developing a diplomatic balance of power in the region. Traditionally non-aligned, India's recent foreign policy has increasingly focused on multi-aligned strategies within various multilateral frameworks such as the G20, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, with China being a member of all these groups, it becomes imperative for India to consider the Quad as a crucial element in its broader foreign policy strategy to hedge against Chinese influence in South Asia. Allies like the US, Japan, and Australia are vital due to their technological prowess, economic investments, and multilateral standings. At the same time, India's advocacy for an independent foreign policy often takes a different path that does not always align with its Quad partners. Its stance on staying neutral during the Ukraine-Russia War and continuing its traditional partnership with Russia on oil and defence has sometimes caused a stir with its allies such as the US.
Japan: From economic development to territorial tussle
For Japan, the Quad is often viewed as a pathway to economic growth. Strengthening economic ties with its neighbours across the Indo-Pacific has been a key component of Japan's regional diplomacy, with Quad partners emerging as valuable trading and investment partners over the past two decades. Australia's economic relationship with Japan has seen significant expansion, and India has become an important destination for Japanese goods and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japan's investments in Indian infrastructure and the broader economy underscore the importance of these economic ties within the Quad framework. While recent events in the East China Sea have led to Japan embracing increased collaboration with its US, Indian, and Australian counterparts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, it comes at a significant moment. During the recent ASEAN Summit, the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers acknowledged that the Sino-Japanese relationship is at a 'crucial juncture.' This situation necessitates bilateral cooperation and renewed dialogue. Unlike most of its Quad members, Japan does not view China as an adversary but rather as a challenging partner, with both countries having engaged in periodic partnerships, including investments in the Belt and Road Initiative and trilateral summits with South Korea. This context requires Japan to navigate its Quad initiatives after careful consideration.
Australia: Strategic realignment through Quad
Australia does not contend with the same territorial disputes as India and Japan. Its recent emphasis on the Quad and resistance to Chinese assertiveness can be largely attributed to its long-standing reliance on the US as an offshore balancer—a role increasingly strained by China's expanding influence. Consequently, Australia’s involvement in the Quad reinforces its strategic alignment with the US while addressing the evolving regional dynamics shaped by China's growing power. Australia's strategy of hedging against China is evident from actions taken even before the Quad's revival. For instance, Australia supported the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the South China Sea, highlighted its stance in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and banned Huawei from its 5G network. Despite recent tensions leading to substantial tariffs on Australian imports by China, this impact is mitigated as Australian products can find alternative markets. Specifically, restrictions on Australian iron ore trade affect China more, as Australian iron ore is reliable and cost-effective compared to other sources, with high demand due to China’s ongoing infrastructure projects, and restrictions on gas exports may harm China more than Australia. Given its position, Australia’s primary geopolitical needs are not necessarily dependent on Quad commitments. It may opt to continue its bilateral efforts with South Pacific countries or explore AUKUS, which offers greater opportunities to enhance Australia’s deterrence capabilities against potential military threats—a primary concern given China’s growing influence.
US: Beyond China but not beyond the Indo-Pacific
For the US, the Quad is not merely a strategy to counter Chinese aggression but a response to a range of geopolitical issues in the region that threaten to undermine US interests. These issues include North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile tests and the security of Taiwan, which may not always be top priorities for countries like India or Australia. India maintains diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, while Australia has yet to recognise Taiwan as a separate state. Additionally, the US is poised for a significant shift in its foreign policy spectrum as President Joe Biden has announced his retirement at a time when former President Donald Trump’s campaigns for the upcoming elections are at their peak. The current president and his Democratic predecessors have typically advocated for a liberal order and diplomatic approaches to foreign policy, whereas former President Trump has taken a more realist approach. His tenure included the tariff war with China, heightened tensions with North Korea over nuclear armaments, and the decision to withdraw from key regional agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This realist approach may not always resonate with the other Quad members. This was evident when former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo clashed with Japan, Australia, and India over collaboration with partners linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation and coercion.
Looking Ahead
The Quad's strategic alliance represents a nuanced and comprehensive approach to tackling challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Each member—India, Japan, Australia, and the US—brings distinct priorities and strategies while sharing a common vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. With upcoming elections in the US in 2024 and Japan in 2025, changes in political leadership could influence foreign policy approaches, potentially impacting current agreements within the Quad. India's recent elections, resulting in Prime Minister Modi continuing his leadership until 2029, provide essential stability. As a leader in bilateral engagements and diplomatic cooperation, India will need to play a pivotal role in maintaining the Quad's unity and advancing cooperation despite the differing objectives of its counterparts. While the Quad remains a significant focus in the Indo-Pacific, its continued presence and effectiveness will depend on the synchronicity of its members' priorities.
Top Stories of the Week
Bharatiya Vayuyan Vidheyak, 2024 Tabled in Lok Sabha
On July 31, 2024, Aviation Minister Rammohan Naidu introduced the Bharatiya Vayuyan Vidheyak 2024 in the Lok Sabha, marking a significant overhaul of the 90-year-old Aircraft Act of 1934. The Bill aims to modernise India's aviation regulations by updating the outdated Aircraft Act, which has seen 21 amendments. It seeks to eliminate ambiguities, reduce redundancies, and align with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards to streamline processes and support global aviation standards.
The proposed legislation grants the Central Government extensive powers to regulate all aspects of aircraft operations, including design, manufacture, and maintenance. It also enhances the authority of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), and the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB). The government has changed the definition of what qualifies as an aircraft, with balloons and gliders removed. A significant change introduced by the Bill is the transfer of Radio Telephone Operator Restricted (RTR) Certificate and Licence testing from the Department of Telecom (DoT) to the DGCA. Through centralisation, the aim is to simplify the certification process for pilots, aircraft maintenance engineers, and flight dispatchers.
The Ministry of Civil Aviation defended the Bill as essential for tackling corruption and inefficiencies in the RTR exam process. Candidates face significant challenges, including high costs and potential bribes, exacerbated by limited exam centres. The Bill aims to address these problems by allowing RTR exams at any of the DGCA’s 14 centres, thereby reducing logistical hurdles and curbing corruption.
Reducing Coal Imports, Boosting Exports
The Ministry of Coal is leading a transformative initiative to reduce coal imports and promote coal exports, marking a significant shift in India's energy landscape. India's coal production witnessed a commendable increase in 2023-24. The government anticipates domestic coal production to grow by 6-7% annually, aiming to reach approximately 1.5 billion tonnes by 2029-30, solidifying India's stature as a major global coal producer.
To enhance the availability of washed coking coal in the steel sector, the government has monetised old washeries of Coal India Limited. A new sub-sector, 'Steel using coking coal through WDO route,' has been created under the Non-Regulated Sector Linkage Auctions. This strategy aims to ensure long-term coal linkage from identified mines throughout the contract period, thereby boosting domestic coking coal consumption in the steel industry.
Additionally, the Ministry of Coal has launched Mission Coking Coal to meet the projected domestic coking coal demand as outlined in the National Steel Policy 2017. As part of the 'AtmaNirbhar Bharat' initiative, domestic raw coking coal production is projected to reach 140 million tonnes by 2030. The government has also approved a Financial Support Scheme with an outlay of ₹8,500 crore as viability gap funding to promote the establishment of Coal/Lignite Gasification Projects for both PSUs and the private sector.
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