In Focus: Delhi’s EV Transition Now Faces Its Real Test
It is no longer accurate to describe air pollution in Delhi as a seasonal crisis that spikes briefly and fades with changing weather patterns. It has become a persistent, structural problem that shapes everyday life in the capital and increasingly dictates the direction of public policy. Across multiple editions of Aakhya Weekly, we have returned to this issue in different contexts. Yet, the underlying concern remains unchanged, with vehicular emissions consistently sitting at the centre of both public discourse and regulatory focus. The data reinforces this centrality with the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM), in its January 2026 report to the Supreme Court, identifying vehicular emissions as the single largest contributor to winter air pollution in Delhi NCR, accounting for 23%
This prioritisation is not new, and can be traced back to earlier interventions such as the odd-even scheme, which marked a visible attempt to curb transport-related pollution and set the tone for future policy action. Over time, this focus has evolved into a more sustained, forward-looking push toward electric mobility, with the Delhi government positioning electric vehicles as a key lever to address air quality challenges and reshape the city’s transport ecosystem.
After months of extensions, prolonged deliberations, and scattered updates indicating that a revised framework was in the works, a new draft of the Delhi EV Policy has finally been placed in the public domain. At first glance, it may seem like just another iteration in an ongoing policy cycle, but such a view risks underestimating its significance in the current context. This draft carries far more weight than a routine update, as it represents both a continuation of intent and an opportunity to strengthen execution where earlier efforts have fallen short.
From Incentives to Enforcement
The draft policy is, in essence, a more authoritative and aggressive iteration of its predecessor. One of the key shifts it places is “only electric three-wheelers (L5) shall be permitted” from January 2027 and “only electric two-wheelers shall be permitted” from April 2028, along with restrictions that “no conventional ICE vehicles… shall be inducted” in identified fleet categories from 2026. Importantly, these mandates are designed around new registrations rather than existing vehicles. This distinction matters. Instead of forcing abrupt changes through bans or compulsory conversions, the policy uses the point of entry into the vehicle fleet as the primary lever. Over time, this ensures a gradual but irreversible shift in the composition of vehicles on the road, without creating immediate disruption.
Alongside regulatory mandates, the policy reworks the structure of financial incentives. It introduces a tapering model where purchase incentives decline over time. For electric two-wheelers, incentives reduce from ₹10,000 per kWh in the first year to ₹3,300 per kWh by the third year, with similar reductions across other segments. At the same time, scrappage incentives are strengthened, with support of up to ₹1 lakh for eligible electric car purchases. This dual approach signals a shift away from long-term subsidy dependence. Instead, it encourages early adoption while gradually pushing the market toward self-sufficiency. The emphasis is no longer on making EVs perpetually cheaper through incentives, but on accelerating the point at which they become viable without state support. This is a strong signal, given that incentives through schemes such as FAME I and FAME II have already been in place for nearly a decade.
The policy also explicitly acknowledges that two-wheelers account for the majority of the vehicle base and that high-usage categories such as three-wheelers and goods carriers contribute disproportionately due to their daily mileage. This informs both the sequencing of mandates and the allocation of incentives. Instead of treating all vehicle categories equally, the policy prioritises those where electrification can deliver the most immediate and measurable benefits.
Fixing the Infrastructure and Ecosystem Gap
Delhi already has a relatively extensive EV charging network compared to most other states, with around 1,957 charging stations, second only to states like Karnataka and Maharashtra. However, the expansion of infrastructure has not always translated into reliability or a consistent user experience, with multiple reports indicating that several stations are either poorly maintained or non-functional.
The draft policy attempts to address this gap by introducing a more coordinated approach, with Delhi Transco Limited (DTL) designated as the “nodal agency for planning, coordination, and implementation” of charging and battery swapping infrastructure. This includes responsibility for identifying locations, managing grid requirements, and streamlining approvals through a single-window system. The policy also requires OEMs to establish charging facilities at dealership locations, effectively leveraging existing networks to expand access. The shift is from fragmented expansion to planned deployment. Whether this translates into better uptime and usability will depend on how effectively DTL implements and maintains these systems.
The 2020 policy only acknowledged the need for battery recycling and reuse, encouraging ecosystem development but without mandating compliance or defining responsibilities. The 2026 draft, in contrast, clearly puts in place enforceable mechanisms. It mandates compliance with the Battery Waste Management Rules, 2022, which means OEMs and other entities are now legally responsible under Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for collecting and processing used batteries. It also introduces specific systems such as battery collection centres across Delhi, standard operating procedures for safe handling and transport, mandatory reporting to authorities, and a traceability system using unique battery identifiers to track batteries through their lifecycle. This marks a clear shift from broad intent to defined responsibilities, infrastructure, and monitoring.
Execution, Awareness, and What Comes Next
In effect, while the draft is well-designed and ambitious in its scope, its success will ultimately depend on how effectively it is implemented on the ground, particularly in light of Delhi’s own experience with similar regulatory frameworks. The Delhi Motor Vehicle Aggregator and Delivery Service Provider Scheme (2023), which introduced fleet electrification mandates, offers a useful reference point, as it has been in operation for a few years but has encountered practical challenges such as compliance portals that do not function consistently, reporting requirements that remain complex for operators, and ambiguity around enforcement, including whether vehicles registered outside Delhi should be counted toward compliance. These issues are not merely administrative, as they directly influence how seriously mandates are adhered to, and highlight that institutional capacity, clarity in rules, and consistent oversight will be critical in determining whether the EV Policy 2026 delivers on its intended outcomes.
At the same time, while the policy makes a strong effort to address charging infrastructure by placing DTL at the centre of planning, coordination, and implementation, questions around grid readiness remain insufficiently addressed, particularly in a city where electricity demand already peaks sharply during summer cooling and winter heating periods. As EV adoption increases, the impact of simultaneous charging loads could become significant, and without clear projections, phased upgrades, and mechanisms for load balancing, there is a risk that infrastructure expansion may outpace system capacity, leading to reliability concerns and affecting user confidence. The policy sets up the institutional framework for planning, but the operational clarity required to ensure resilience under peak demand conditions will be equally important.
In addition to infrastructure and governance challenges, there is also a behavioural dimension that the policy alone cannot fully resolve, as private users continue to remain hesitant due to concerns around charging reliability, battery performance, resale value, and upfront costs, even in the presence of incentives. While regulatory mandates are likely to drive adoption in high-usage segments such as fleets and commercial vehicles, broader market acceptance will require sustained efforts to build confidence, where collaboration with OEMs becomes critical not just for deploying charging infrastructure but also for strengthening service networks, improving financing access, offering reliable warranties, and ensuring consistent after-sales support. Alongside this, there is a clear need for more structured awareness efforts that go beyond policy announcements, including targeted engagement with consumers, drivers, and small operators to explain the economics of EVs, address concerns around usage and maintenance, and make the transition more tangible.
Ultimately, while the policy sets a clear direction, its effectiveness will depend on how well these gaps are addressed in practice and how actively stakeholders engage with it at this stage. As consumers and participants in this transition, the role goes beyond passive adoption and includes engaging with the policy itself, especially since the draft, released on 11 April 2026, is open for public consultation until 10 May 2026. This window provides an opportunity to flag concerns, offer practical inputs, and help shape the kind of Delhi we will live in, while contributing to efforts to curb the city’s persistent air pollution.
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India Signs FTA with NZ, Securing Duty-free Access to Markets and Investment worth $20B
India signed an FTA with New Zealand on 27 April 2026, in New Delhi. The negotiations have been dubbed a diplomatic success, as the agreement was concluded in a record nine months across only five formal rounds of negotiation. New Zealand has pledged to invest $20 billion in India over the next 15 years. The FTA spans 20 chapters covering trade in goods, trade remedies, dispute settlement, and legal frameworks. New Zealand has committed to eliminating duties on 100% of its 8,284 tariff lines for Indian exports upon entry into force, while India opened 70.03% of its tariff lines, covering 95% of current imports from New Zealand.
This FTA will be particularly beneficial to the leather and footwear, pharmaceuticals, textiles, engineering goods, sports goods, chemicals, electronics, fruits, vegetables and marine products significantly. New Zealand will offer temporary visas for Indian professionals, issuing 1,667 visas annually for three years, and a cap of 5,000. The India-New Zealand bilateral trade stands at approximately $1.3 billion in 2024-25, and the agreement sets a target to double this to $5 billion within the next five years.
Delhi Submits Draft State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) 2.0 to the Union Ministry
The Government of Delhi has submitted a draft State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) 2.0 to the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, revising the 2019 plan. The policy entails a roadmap to address climate challenges in the capital, integrating mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation (coping with impacts). It aligns with India’s national climate commitments, including the Paris Agreement, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Long-term low emission development strategy (LT-LEDS).
This plan is especially significant for the state of Delhi, in the wake of worsening air pollution, rising temperatures, heatwaves, and urban flooding risks. It aims to guide sector-wise interventions across transport, energy, water, urban planning, and public health. The plan aims to mitigate the crisis with a data-based approach, with a stronger implementation focus, and alignment with global sustainability goals.
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